Posts Tagged ‘LCD TV’

The Rout Is On – by Pete Putman

As things go, the flat screen TV business is relatively young. Until ten years ago, large LCD TVs weren’t even viable products. And plasma dominated the large screen (42” and up) flat screen TV business.

 

But neither technology held any substantial market share. Instead, CRT televisions (and rear-projection CRT sets) were ‘kings of the hill.’

 

Going back through some of my archives, I found that in the fourth quarter of 2005, CRT TVs held a 78.9% worldwide market share. That represented a decline of 15% from Q4 of 2004, no doubt due to the 137% increase in LCD TV market share in the same time period (yes, you read that right, 137%!).

 

While LCD TVs held a 14.7% market share, plasma TV share grew from 1.8% of all TVs sold to 3.9%, a growth rate of 109%. CRT rear-projection TVs held .9% of the market, a drop of 60% from Q4 ’04, while microdisplay RPTVs grew to 1.6% of the pie, an increase of 52% over the same time period. (All numbers compiled from DisplaySearch reports.)

 

How about the major TV brands? From Q3 ’05 to Q4 ’05, it might surprise you to learn that Sony had the top TV brand revenue share and growth, with 14% of all TV sales revenue (a quarterly growth rate of 130%)! Samsung was right behind with 11% revenue share and 36% Q-Q growth, followed by Philips (9.1% revenue share, 31% Q-Q growth), Panasonic (8.3% revenue share, 13% Q-Q growth), and LG (7.8% revenue share, 28% Q-Q growth).

 

These five companies accounted for 50% of all TV revenue in Q4 of 2005. And there was only about a 6-point spread between #1 and #5, so the pie was being divvied up pretty equally.

 

In terms of TV brand unit share, the order was changed somewhat. LG captured the number one spot with 9.8% unit share in Q4 ‘05, followed by Samsung (9.2%), TTE (7.5%), Philips (7.1%), and Sony (6.9%). The remaining 60% was chopped up among a host of brands.

 

The eye-opener here was when I went back to the beginning of 2005. For the first quarter of the year, Sharp topped the branded TV market share with an amazing 21% (a year-to-year growth of 82%). Philips was number 2 with 14.7% share, followed by Samsung (10.8%), Sony (10%), and LG (7.3%). The five brands accounted for 60% of all TV sales back then.

 

So – in a little less than a year, Sony added 7% to its brand share, while Samsung marched in place, LG picked up about 2 points, Sharp fell off the map completely, and Philips lost half its brand share. (TTE didn’t show up in the 2005 listings at all.)

 

Now, let’s jump ahead to Q4 2011. NPD DisplaySearch’s latest numbers show that LCD flatscreen TVs now account for 86.5% of all TVs sold worldwide. Plasma continues to decline as it pushes into a larger screen ‘niche,’ grabbing a miniscule 6.9% market share. Amazingly, CRT TVs still held a 6.4% share, while RPTVs managed to eke out a .0004% market share – look for this category to be killed off completely in 2012.

 

And the tables have turned completely from 2005 in terms of worldwide market share. Samsung managed the amazing feat of increasing its market share to 26.3% from Q4 ’10 to Q4 ’11, an all-time record and an amazing growth rate of 18% in an otherwise-flat (no pun intended) industry. LG was far behind Samsung with a 13.4% market share, essentially unchanged since Q4 ’10.

 

As for Sony, they also held steady at 9.8%, basically the same as a year before, while Panasonic saw a decline of 2% to 6.9%. Sharp – who continues to sell fewer LCD TVs than Panasonic, incredibly – experienced a decline of 7% from Q4 ’10 to a 5.9% market share in Q4 ’11. These five brands accounted for 62.3% of the 74,236,000 TVs sold.

 

So what does this all mean? First, Samsung has clearly blown away everyone else in the TV industry, opening up a double-digit lead over their nearest competitor (LG) in market share. And those two guys waste time arguing about whether passive or active is better for 3D viewing?

 

Second, we’re seeing the slow, inexorable end of the Japanese television industry, just as we saw it happen in the United States in the late 1970s to the late 1980s. Sharp, Sony, and Panasonic are all hemorrhaging money for the current fiscal year that ends on March 31, and the consumer TV business is the primary reason.

 

When TVs sold for $50 per diagonal inch and up, there was plenty of money on the table for everyone. But now that mainstream TVs screen sizes (up to 55 inches) are selling for $10 – $15 per diagonal inch, the Japanese simply can’t compete anymore. And it will only get worse with Chinese TV brands Haier, Hisense, TCL, and others establishing beachheads on all continents.

 

Third, it’s over. The fat lady has sung. Samsung has won. They set out in the mid-1990s to beat Sony at their own game, and by any reasonable account, have succeeded beyond their wildest dreams. Samsung will make a nice profit on 2011 TV sales, and LG will at least get their LCD TV business back into the black.

 

But the story isn’t so pretty for Sharp, Sony, and Panasonic. Sharp still has no explanation for their continual slide in market share, which apparently began in 2005 and continued uninterrupted, and which has now idled (by some accounts) 50% of their LCD fab capacity. As for Panasonic, they’d already shut down one LCD and one plasma factory in 2011, because demand just isn’t there. And no one in Osaka knows how to fix the problem.

 

Sony is being pressured by financial analysts in Japan to get out of the TV business altogether, a decision which, as painful as it might be to management given Sony’s long and rich history with TV manufacturing, is probably the most sensible thing to do. The company’s TV business has lost money for eight straight years – never mind the strong market share numbers that popped up early on.

 

And it’s not going to get better any time soon, as DisplaySearch stated that 2011 worldwide TV shipments actually declined .3% in 2011, reversing six consecutive years of growth. Only the LCD TV category showed any increase with a bare-bones 1% uptick. Everything else was on a downhill slide, with plasma declining 7%, CRTs falling 43%, and RPTVs in a 51% tailspin.

 

Hitachi has already pulled the plug on their TV business. Toshiba and Mitsubishi will no doubt follow suit in the next 12-24 months. And that will leave us with the Hatfields & McCoys in Korea, plus a host of Chinese brands you may want to get familiar with. (The running joke at CES 2012 is that it was the “Chinese” Electronics Show, and that’s not far from the truth!)

 

The rout is on…

3M Wants to Expand Market for DBEF Reflective Polarizer, by Ken Werner

During CES 2012, 3M’s Optical Systems Division set up a demonstration in the Sony Theater at the MGM Grand. Dave Lamb (Senior Physics Research Specialist) and Dave Iverson (Business Manager, LCD Television Business) discussed a consumer study sponsored by 3M and conducted by CBS Vision that bolstered 3M’s contention that using the company’s Vikuiti DBEF reflective polarizer film is a significant value add for TV brands.

The results of the study had been announced a few weeks previously, but in Las Vegas I could experience the experimental set-up and explore some aspects not covered in the press release.

First, let’s back up. What is DBEF, and what does it do? In a conventional backlit LCD display, only half the light from the backlight passes through the bottom absorbing polarizer. It is only this light, which is polarized in the proper direction to make it through the bottom polarizer, that can be processed by the LCD pixels to make an image. So, before the display can do anything useful with the light, we are throwing half of it away.

3M’s Dual Brightness Enhancing Film (DBEF) is a reflective polarizer film that reflects light of the “wrong” polarization instead of absorbing it. When the light bounces around after being reflected, its polarization is randomized by its reflections, so some of this light can now pass through the DBEF film. Ultimately, most of the light that originally had the “wrong” polarization, makes it through the DBEF. Since the polarization axis of the DBEF is aligned with the axis of the bottom polarizer, most of this light passes through the bottom polarizer. (Not all of the light passes through, because the bottom polarizer is not 100% transparent even for light of the correct polarization.) Measurements have shown that DBEF displays are 32% brighter than displays without DBEF.
So, how was this perceived by subjects in the CBS Visual study? In the study, viewers were placed mid-way between two TV sets, each viewed at a 45-degree angle. One TV set had a DBEF reflective polarizer in the optical stack, the other had only the standard absorptive polarizer. Although there was more light in the viewing cone, the DBEF set used 15% less power.

When I sat where the test subjects had been seated, the DBEF set was clearly brighter. Lamb said that 88% of test group agreed with me, and that 83% of males and 64% of females 55 years old and older said they would pay an average of $200 for such a set.

Among the test group 46% said they typically watched their TV set at a viewing angle more than 15 degrees from dead center even when viewing alone. That number jumped to 67% for viewing with other people.

Lamb told me 3M has characterized roughly 150 TV sets since 2007-08. The typical luminance was 500 nits in 2008; it is 300 nits now. Energy Star is a major reason for the shift. But 500 nits was overkill at the time, motivated my luminance being a point of differentiation at a time when LCD-TV was still battling with both CRT and plasma for dominance. But now, Lamb said, TV manufacturers may be pushing the lower limit of luminance in pursuit of additional energy savings. How dim is too dim?

Clearly, 3M would like to convince TV manufacturers that DBEF is the solution to this conundrum for a wider range of models. DBEF is currently used in many high-end sets (including “a preponderance” of Sony sets), but 3M is hoping that with more awareness of users wanting higher viewing angle and more brightness in addition to low power, TV makers will respond.

Ho-Ho-Ho! Is Turning Into Uh-Oh-Oh!

The results are in, and they aren’t pretty.

 

Both Sony and Panasonic posted substantial losses for the current fiscal quarter and are looking at lots of red ink next March, when their current fiscal year ends. Sony forecast a $2.2 billion loss for its TV operations in the fiscal year that ends next March. Overall, the company is looking at a $1.1 billion net loss for the current financial year, which reverses an earlier prediction of a $730 million profit.

 

This is Sony’s eighth straight year of losses for its flagship TV lines and rumors are flying that its S-LCD partnership with Samsung may be deep-sixed. Earlier, Sony announced it would split its television business into three divisions, consisting of (a) outsourcing, (b) the current LCD TV business, and (c) next-generation TVs (read: OLEDs), starting November 1.

 

But that may not be enough to stem the tide. Some prominent Asian market analysts think Sony should bite the bullet and just pull the plug on TVs altogether, concentrating on their gaming console, smart phone, VAIO computer, and camcorder operations.

 

The easier path to income may be for Sony to license its name to a Chinese TV manufacturer and collect royalties, much the same as Philips has done with Funai in North America.

 

Panasonic is looking at as much as $5.4 billion in losses by year’s end. The culprits are the high value of the yen against the dollar and euro, and the merger and re-sizing of the combined Sanyo – Panasonic operations.

 

Two TV manufacturing plants in Japan will be taken offline, while plasma TV production capacity will be cut by 48%. Further procurement will move to Singapore from Osaka, and plans to relocate plasma fabs to mainland China will also be put into limbo. The company expects to cut its payroll to 350,000 employees worldwide.

 

What does all of this mean to you? Expect to see deep discounts on TVs starting around Black Friday. There will be some amazing deals on large (55 inch and up) LCD and plasma TVs. Even the 3D products are going to come down in price, continuing a trend of diminishing premiums for 3D functionality.

 

So if you are in the market for a new LCD or plasma TV, this could be the perfect year to upgrade. Watch your online price trackers and be ready to move when you see a good price. Right now, you can find ‘basic’ LCD and plasma TVs for about $10-$12 per diagonal inch, up to 55 inches – use that as a baseline when you are wheeling and dealing. Who knows? You may do even better!

Wishing Won’t Make It So

These Elite sets may look great, but you can't get by on looks anymore in the TV game.

Last Thursday in New York City, Pioneer and Sharp took the wraps off a new line of high-end LCD TVs that will carry the familiar Elite brand. These products are intended to fill a hole in the high-end television retail channel; one that was created when Pioneer pulled the plug on their Kuro plasma sets a couple of years ago.

 

For readers who didn’t know, Sharp owns a 14% stake in Pioneer, and the two companies have collaborated on products in the past. You may not remember, but Sharp once carried 42-inch and 50-inch Pioneer plasma TVs in their line. That was back in the day when large LCD panels were difficult to manufacture and very expensive.

 

It’s instructive here to remember why Pioneer pulled out of the plasma TV business. First off, Pioneer had the smallest fabrication capacity of any of the big plasma brands, cranking out a fraction of the monthly yields of Panasonic and Samsung.

 

Second, Pioneer made the mistake of continuing to focus only on high-end retail channels for their plasma TVs long after it was clear that the plasma market was being commoditized. Panasonic’s best plasma TV sets were widely available through numerous brick-and-mortar stores for much lower prices and offered comparable performance to Pioneer’s offerings.

 

Even the vaunted Kuro sets couldn’t compete. Sure, they had super-deep black levels. But the additional first surface polarizers used to pull off that trick also dropped brightness levels to the point where the Kuro sets had to be viewed in dark or near-dark rooms. Panasonic, Samsung, and LG suffered from no such limitations.

 

In the end, the math is what did Pioneer in. You can’t make money these days selling a mass-produced flat screen display product in limited quantities at a price premium. It simply will not work. That is one reason why Hitachi exited the plasma TV business and ultimately the LCD TV business in the United States.

 

It appears that Pioneer didn’t learn that lesson. Neither did Sharp, who has a seen a precipitous drop in LCD TV market share since 2006. The Aquos brand, which once commanded better than 20% of the U.S. TV market, now struggles to hold onto 3% of it. Even the new Quattron four-color LCD TVs have met largely with yawns, and it doesn’t help that TVs are a tough sell in general these days. (Notice how even market giant Vizio has been pushing tablets and phones lately?)

 

According to a story in TWICE, the motivation for the new Elite LCD TVs came from Cedia dealers who said there was a definite hole in the market after the Kuro sets were discontinued and Runco shut down its Vidikron brand. (Runco/Planar’s misadventures in the home theater channel are another story altogether.)

 

Hence, Sharp and Pioneer created an Elite sales and marketing channel, with Sharp providing the TVs and Pioneer supplying Blu-ray players and AV receivers. The Elite TVs will be sold exclusively in North America, limited at first to about 750 dealers with the possibility of expansion into a larger base.

 

Elite dealers can either order TVs directly from Sharp or through a one-step distribution process. That last sentence should give pause; moving products to distribution guarantees that prices will drop over time and more retail outlets will be found to increase the volume of sales, thereby removing the ‘elite’ part of the equation. That’s what distributors do, unless they’re not serious about making money.

 

If this is such a good idea, why haven’t Sony and Samsung taken a similar approach? Sony’s woes with TV profitability are well-documented, while Samsung (and LG, and even Panasonic) recognized that mass-produced products can’t be sold in onesies and twosies for very long. But with Sharp’s inability to reverse its six-year slide in TV market share and Pioneer’s apparent jonesing to get back into the TV business, it appears both companies will give any idea a try these days.

 

For the record, the two Elite models that were launched were the 60-inch PRO-60X5FD, shipping this week for $5,999, and the 70-inch PRO-70X5FD, shipping later this month for $8,499. Those same screen sizes in the Aquos LCD TV line can be had for about $3,300 and $4,800, respectively.

 

The usual hype accompanied the press event, with Pioneer claiming these sets have the best black levels in the LCD TV business (that’s not saying much) and no competitors can come close. Sound familiar?

 

Here’s something else to think about. According to HIS iSuppli research, the “sweet spot” for U.S. TV sales is in the range of 40 to 49 inches. In the first quarter of 2011, that bracket accounted for 40% of all TV sales. The #2 position was occupied by the 30 – 39 inch group with 25% of all TV sales. In short. these two categories combined accounted for two out of every three TVs sold in this country from January through March.

 

Screens measuring 50 inches and larger represented 23% of all TV sales in that same time period. Although iSuppli didn’t drill down, I’d bet that 60 to 70 percent of the TVs sold within that category measured between 50 and 55 inches. That doesn’t leave a lot of market share to play with, if you want to sell 60-inch and larger screens.

 

The question here – as was the case with the Kuro plasma TVs – is how many units would have to be sold to turn a profit, and how many units the pro AV and Cedia channels could absorb at the listed prices. I would suspect that the answers are (a) a lot more than Sharp and Pioneer think, and (b) a lot less than Sharp and Pioneer think.Again, it’s all about the numbers these days – competitive prices and volume of sales.

 

Sharp has additional pressure on it to perform, given that it built the world’s only Gen 10 LCD fab a couple of years ago in Sakai, Japan. Sony was supposed to hold a 34% stake in the fab, but has capped its investment below 10% and is instead looking to China for lower-cost LCD TV panels. What will Sharp do with all of that capacity? And the fact that their finished panels are too expensive when compared to Korean and Chinese glass?

 

You can’t exist on high-end TV sales alone. Mitsubishi was the latest company to figure this out and underwent a massive re-organization this past spring to try and salvage what’s left of their rear-projection TV operations. Sony has lost so much money in the television business that it may have to walk away from manufacturing altogether and just private-label Chinese-made products in the future.

 

Wishing won’t make it so.